Abstract: Complex networks' resilience against attacks represents a crucial issue in terms of network structure integrity. We investigate the effect of removing nodes on the network diameter in the case of a simultaneous targeted attack and sequential targeted attack. The analysis has been implemented on several network instances, taking into account different centrality measures and clustering coefficients values. Empirical networks have also been observed to compare the effects of the two removal schemes. According to classical literature, we assume that the network attacker has a wide-ranging knowledge of the system. It can be defined as clairvoyant since it knows, a priori, of all the characteristics of the problem's instances. This awareness is not always applicable when real networks are characterised by a dynamic environment. Hence, we distinguish between clairvoyant and non-clairvoyant attacks.
Introduction
Networks can be considered as a valuable representation of many complex systems found in the real world, in which the nodes are the elementary components and the links or arcs connect pairs of nodes that mutually interact. There are several relevant examples of networks in different sectors (Newman, 2010) ), for instance, technological networks, such as the World Wide Web, in which the nodes are webpages and the links are hyperlinks; biological networks, such as protein-protein interaction networks where nodes denote proteins and links represent two proteins that interact; neural systems where nodes signify neurons and links represent neural connections; and social networks in which nodes represent individuals or groups and links indicate the relations between them.
From this perspective, the analysis of the network's behaviour is considered useful in order to acquire insight regarding the complex systems they represent (Cinelli et al., 2016; Ferraro and Iovanella, 2015; .
A crucial issue concerns the robustness of the overall network to the failure of its constituent elements. Indeed, the protection of critical infrastructures relies on the identification of its relevant elements and on the understanding of the damage caused by their deletions or failures (Barrat et al., 2008) .
The study of tolerance against random failures or intentional attacks allows us to design systems well integrated in their environment and to consider whether errors or attacks can occur. The identification of the most relevant nodes provides opportunity to protect existing networks and permits in order to take the suitable countermeasures to reduce their effectiveness.
We consider the networks' capacity to withstand the removal of elements in case of deletion of a single component (Albert et al., 2000) and, in particular, the networks' robustness, i.e., the capacity of the network to perform its basic functions even in the event of missing nodes and links -the ability of a network to tollerate strains and to maintain its functionality in some way -and the resilience, i.e., its dynamical feature that entails a change in the network's essential activities -the ability of a system to return to its normal state after a disturbance. Hence, resilience can be considered as the capacity of the network to adapt to internal and external errors by altering its processes while continuing to perform (Barabási, 2016) . As many real networks are observed to possess a heavy-tailed degree distribution, the presence of elements with a relatively large number of connections makes such systems particularly exposed to intentional attack (Chen and Cheng, 2015) .
In this paper, we focus on the scale-free networks that are more prone to displaying a large robustness concerning random failures and high vulnerability to targeted attacks on the most important elements (Albert et al., 2000) . In situations when attacks refer to a removal process targeted to specific nodes, i.e., those highly connected, the deletion of a single hub does not fragment the system as the remaining hubs can still hold the system's integrity. However, if the number of removed nodes reaches a critical threshold, the network suddenly breaks into disconnected components.
To simulate a deliberate attack, the most connected nodes are eliminated, accompanied by, in sequence, the others in decreasing order of connectivity. In scale-free networks, when the most linked nodes are removed, the diameter increases rapidly. This vulnerability to attacks is due to the inhomogeneity of the connectivity distribution. The removal of the few highly linked nodes alters the network topology and decreases the capacity of the remaining nodes to communicate with one another.
Therefore, the structural robustness is not valid against a deliberate attack, as the simultaneous removal of the most connected nodes will destroy any system showing its fragility or its own Achilles' Heel; the network behind is robust enough to tolerate random failures but vulnerable against attacks.
In general, once a small fraction of nodes is detached, the distance among the remaining nodes increases, since some paths that contribute to the network connectivity are eliminated and, for the remaining nodes, it is more difficult to communicate with each other. For this reason, we investigate the effect of the nodes removal on the diameter (D), i.e., the length of the shortest path between the most distanced nodes, measuring the extent of the network and the topological length between two nodes. Indeed, a positive correlation exists between the diameter value and the ability of nodes to communicate with each other , particularly in innovation systems.
The smaller D is, the shorter the expected path between the network elements is as the central nodes act as bridges between the many peripherals. If the value of D is relatively small, the path among farthest nodes is very short; as a consequence, all elements appear strongly connected. Thus everyone in the network is fairly close to one another with a straightforward information flow in the system.
The effects of removing nodes in case of error and attack have been analysed by classic literature. Nevertheless, there is an inherent ambiguity in studying the resilience of complex networks. We recognise at least three different important issues, such as several proxy quantities to evaluate the network resilience, diverse strategies to attack the systems, and various methods to differentiate the importance of nodes and links.
Our contribution, in this paper, is an in-depth analysis of the networks' robustness against different schemes of attacks. In particular, we study the effects on the diameter of two different methods of removing nodes (Iyer et al., 2013) with respect to the classical centrality measures such as the degree centrality, the betweenness centrality, the closeness centrality, and the eigenvector centrality. We also consider such effects referred to as the local clustering coefficient.
Herein, we introduce a further element; it has been demonstrated in Xiao et al. (2008) that intentional attack is the most effective strategy to disrupt the entire network when the entity that removes the network elements (the attacker) has a wide-ranging knowledge of the system's topology. Xiao et al. (2008) show that incomplete global information has different effects on the intentional attack in diverse situations, while attacks based on local information can be considered extremely efficient.
Referring to current literature, we consider both the hypothesis that the attacker has knowledge of the network structure as well as the notion that the attacker is only aware of part of the network architecture.
Thus, we call the attacker as clairvoyant -the expression clairvoyant is used in the literature of task scheduling (Dell'Olmo et al., 2008) -when it knows a priori all characteristics of the problem's instances. In this case, it leverages the network topology to target the crucial nodes instead of launching attacks on the entire network to efficiently destroy the system and reduce the risk of being detected.
This awareness is feasible only for some networks such as the electric power systems or the protein-protein interaction networks. On the contrary, the attacker is non-clairvoyant when it ignores certain network features. Such a situation also arises in many real circumstances as, for example, when networks are mined from very large databases and incompleteness or inaccuracy are intrinsic due to the complexity of technological or methodological issues.
For this study, we use the network science approach that allows us to understand networks emerging in nature, technology and society by means of a unified set of tools and principles (Barabási, 2013) . We represent the networks as graphs that are mathematical abstractions of such systems. The analysis is performed in several generated scale-free networks' instances and in four empirical networks.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 summarises the related works; Section 3 describes the simulation setting; Section 4 shows the computational results and analysis; Section 5 presents the conclusions.
Related work
Many real networks reveal the same characteristic of having a scale-free feature (Wang and Chen, 2003) that considers the nodes degree k and the related probability distribution P (k), i.e., the probability P (k) that a node in the network interacts with k other nodes decays with the law P (k) ∼ k −γ with slope γ as the scaling exponent, with 2 ≤ γ ≤ 3. These particular networks that display skewed degree distributions have an inhomogeneous topology due to a relatively small number of highly connected nodes (hubs) and a large number of low degree nodes, and were introduced in Barabási, and Albert (1999) (BA model).
The network robustness represents one of the most interesting features of scale-free networks (Albert et al., 2000) . Robustness refers mainly to the structural properties of a system that allow it to withstand stress, perturbations or variations in its internal structure or external environment without adapting and before an irreversible malfunction. It is the ability of a system to sustain a giant component, i.e., the connected component that includes a majority of nodes.
Literature observes that the network connectivity and thus its functionality is robust against random failure of nodes (Albert et al., 2000; Callaway et al., 2000; Cohen et al., 2001) and to some extent is even robust against intentional attacks (Broder et al., 2000) .
On the other hand, resilience refers to "the capacity of a system to absorb and utilise or even benefit from perturbations and changes that attain it, and so to persist without a qualitative change in the systems structure" (Holling, 1973) . The system may take new external conditions into account by absorbing them into its way of functioning. Therefore the difference between resilience and robustness lies in the extent to which endogenous changes in the dynamics may be introduced into a network under the impact of exogenous changes.
The process of removing part of network's nodes together with the links connected to them is closely related to percolation that offers a theoretical model for studying the robustness of the systems (Callaway et al., 2000; Cohen et al., 2000) . The study of percolation in terms of networks considers how the size of the giant component changes as nodes are removed from the system. Indeed, when the fraction of the detached nodes exceeds certain critical value, the largest component disappears and the entire network disintegrates into smaller sub-networks.
If the size of the giant component is sufficiently small, with respect to the original size of the system, it is reasonable to assume that the network will be unable to function in any sensitive way. Therefore the network is considered connected in a percolation sense if the giant component still exists after several nodes' deletion and the network can continue its main operations even in case of temporal node malfunction as long as most of the nodes are still connected (Chen and Cheng, 2015) .
The diameter as a proxy measure of a network's response to failure or attack has been studied in Shargel et al. (2003) . Authors analysed scale-free and exponential networks, introducing two parameters corresponding to growth and preferential attachment.
A set of analytical tools with which to identify the control and state parameters of a multi-dimensional complex system has been recently developed in Gao et al. (2016) .
Another measure related to the resilience is the assortative coefficient, i.e., the degreedegree correlation level. Networks with a positive assortative coefficient are expected to have a resilient core of interconnected nodes with high degree while disassortative networks show hubs widely distributed and consequently more vulnerable (Rubinov and Sporns, 2010) .
The effect on network structure of removing nodes according to sequential and simultaneous targeted attacks has been observed in Iyer et al. (2013) . Its authors analysed networks with different degree distributions, clustering coefficients and assortativity coefficients using the vulnerability measure instead of the diameter and extended their analysis on the classic centrality measures.
It has been observed in Xiao et al. (2008) that the intentional attack is the most effective attack strategy to disrupt the whole system when the adversary has knowledge of the network structure. This implies that the intentional attacks are the most effective threat on the network robustness.
To identify the most relevant elements in a network, the correlation between degree and betweenness centrality for both nodes and links in random and BA networks has been observed in Holme et al. (2002) .
We observe that the majority of the research on network robustness against attacks concerns the intrinsic structural vulnerabilities while the studies on the impacts of implementing network defence mechanisms are in a preliminary stage. Indeed, in Xiao and Xiao (2011) a node protection scheme is proposed to prevent an attack on a subset of nodes in the network. A sequential hypothesis test approach is shown in Waid (2004) to identify the attack while getting as little information from the network in order to provide an efficient defence. To enhance the network robustness, a sequential defence mechanism based on sequential hypothesis test has been introduced in Chen and Cheng (2015) .
Simulation setting
We refer to the classical mathematical abstraction of a network such as graph G. A graph G = (V, E) is composed of a set V of n nodes and a set E of m links or arcs defining the interactions between nodes.
We indicate a node by an index i meaning that we allow a one-to-one correspondence between an index and a node. In this work, we are interested in undirected and unweighted graphs. We consider the Barabási-Albert (BA) scale-free network model in which nodes prefer to link to those more connected due to the preferential attachment mechanism. A single node or hub cannot be considered representative since these networks are held together by a different, although limited, number of highly connected hubs while the majority of nodes has smaller connection degree than the average. This paper focuses on the effect of the error and attack on the network diameter that is one measure of path length providing an upper bound value. The random failure or error is the capacity of the network to uphold its connectivity features even in cases of casual deletion of a portion of its nodes or links.
The attack refers to a removal process targeted to specific and crucial nodes. In real networks, the deletion of a single hub does not fragment the system as the remaining hubs can still hold the system's integrity. However, if the number of removed nodes reaches a critical threshold, the network suddenly breaks into disconnected components.
In scale-free networks, the diameter remains unchanged under an increasing level of errors and the connections among the remaining nodes are unaffected due to the inhomogeneous connectivity distribution. Indeed, scale-free networks (Caldarelli, 2007) are characterised by the majority of nodes having few links, therefore nodes with small connectivity are selected with much higher probability than hubs and their removal does not alter the paths' structure and has no influence on the overall network architecture. Therefore, the error, i.e., random removal, of a finite fraction of nodes does not break apart a large scale-free network because the chance of removing one of the few large hubs is negligible and the numerous small nodes play a limited role in maintaining the network's integrity.
Real networks show a high degree of robustness and resilience even though key components regularly malfunction thus local failures rarely lead to loss of the global ability of the systems. However, even though they remain unaffected by random failures, these networks seem vulnerable to targeted attacks on its key components.
In this paper, we analyse the robustness of networks under the random removal in case of error and two different schemes of nodes attacks: simultaneous targeted attack and sequential targeted attack and we investigate the effects on the diameter since a positive correlation exists between the diameter value and the ability of nodes to communicate to each other . Furthermore, we consider an additional robustness measure called threshold of crash (Xiao et al., 2008) defined as the percentage of removed nodes when the giant component is reduced to the 5% with respect to the original network size n.
We examine the simultaneous targeted attack when the centrality measures are calculated for all nodes in the network and afterward an increasing fraction of nodes are detached in order of the centrality measure, from highest to lowest value.
Given the number of nodes n, in the network, the simulation runs for n steps and the fraction of nodes removed is equal to the number of the current step minus one.
Here the attacker is assumed clairvoyant, i.e., at the beginning of the run it knows the adjacency matrix of the network so it is able to compute all centrality measures that are calculated at the beginning of the simulation for all nodes.
We also study the sequential targeted attack, when the centrality measures are calculated for all nodes in the initial network and the node with highest centrality is removed. The deletion of this node results in a new network in which the centrality quantities of the remaining nodes may be different from the values that were calculated previously. Therefore, we recalculate the centrality measures of all nodes in the new system and again eliminate the highest ranked until the desired fraction of nodes has been removed.
Given the number of nodes n, the simulation runs for n steps within which a node having the highest centrality value is removed. The centrality measures are computed at the beginning of each step on the giant component of the current network resulting from the node removal of the previous step.
In our simulation we also distinguish between clairvoyant and non-clairvoyant attacks since the awareness of the network structure is not always applicable. We consider, as a preliminary analysis, the case in which the attacker ignores the nodes with the highest value of centrality. This approach is suggested by some common strategies used in the World Wide Web where network robustness is strengthening hiding hubs' IP addresses or keeping detailed network connections as confidential (Xiao et al., 2008) .
In Section 4, we show the simulation analysis, considering several instances of benchmarking generated according to certain significant measures and four empirical networks proposed by classic scientific literature.
Centrality measures
Different measures of centrality have been considered to identify the nodes with particular relevance and influence.
Central nodes face fewer constraints and have more opportunities due to a better position and greater influence. However, the concept of centrality has an inherent ambiguity; there is no point in including all measures in one method. The best ones are related to the applications depending on the degrees of the local and overall structures. There is a similarity in certain measures and a node rank can depend on the status of that to which it is connected.
In this work, we consider the following centrality measures: degree centrality that is computed as the number of directly connected nodes to i, betweenness centrality that is calculated as the amount of times i connects other nodes to each other, closeness centrality that is measured as the inverse of the distance between i and network vertices, the eigenvector centrality that considers the node's influence in a network according to the number and the quality of its connections.
The classical topological measure of centrality is the nodes' degree centrality, which shows the number of links incident upon a node. It can be interpreted in terms of the size of members' neighbourhoods within the network and measures an individual's involvement in the network. The degree defines the immediate risk of a member to catch whatever is flowing through the network and quantifies how well it is connected to the other elements of the graph, i.e., the number of partners the node has. However, by observing only the degree, we ignore those nodes with small degrees that are relevant for connecting various regions of the system by operating as bridges.
The betweenness centrality determines the number of times a node acts as bridge along the shortest path between two other nodes. Thus, it draws attention to who is critical for a network's information flow. In formula:
where σ kj (i) is the number of shortest path from k to j containing node i and σ kj is the number of shortest path from k to j. When the betweenness is high, the corresponding node lies on many shorter paths and is able to channel and control the flow of information in the network.
The closeness centrality measures how many steps on average it takes for a node to reach the others in the network. Nodes that have high closeness can most efficiently make contact with others in the system. Closeness is based on the length of the average shortest path between a node and all other nodes in the network.
where d G (i, j) denotes the distance between nodes i and j. The eigenvector centrality represents the node's influence in a network according to the number and the quality of its connections. It is sensitive to instances where an element with low degree centrality can be connected to another with high degree centrality and gain an advantage from that connection. This measure is high when a node is connected to other well-connected nodes. Indeed, a node with a smaller number of high quality links has more power than one with a larger number of mediocre contacts. The eigenvector centrality has the formula:
where λ is the largest eigenvalue of A, x i is the eigenvector of A and w ij the weight of link (i, j). Eigenvector centrality relates to the access of innovative information since high value indicates that the node is connected to many others who are themselves connected to others.
Clustering coefficients
A common characteristic of many complex networks is clustering. The local clustering coefficient C i measures how well the neighbours of a given node i are locally interconnected. Thus, how close node's neighbours are to forming a clique. The local clustering coefficient is defined as
where E i is the number of links between the neighbours of i. The higher the local clustering of a node, the more connected its neighbours, thus increasing the path diversity locally around the node. The local clustering coefficient C i has an inherent interest since it captures the capacity of link creations among neighbours, i.e., the tendency in the network to create stable groups.
The cluster coefficient C of the whole network is the average of all C i over all i. Note that C ≤ 1 and assumes a value equal to 1 in case of a clique, i.e., a fully coupled network.
Computational results and analysis
Herein, we show the computational results for the different simulation scenarios. The simulations were performed by removing, at each time step, nodes in order of their importance. Nodes were ordered after calculating the following centrality measures: degree, betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector. Furthermore, we consider the clustering coefficient.
The data processing, the network analysis and all simulations are conducted using the software R (R Core Team, 2014) with the igraph package (Csardi and Nepusz, 2006) .
Extensive numerical simulations have been performed on two schemes of attack, simultaneous targeted attack and sequential targeted attack as described in Section 3.
The simultaneous targeted attack was implemented in a routine that considers graph G an input. Considering n as the number of vertices of G, the routine performs the calculation of the centrality measures and then runs n steps in which subroutines, for each of such measures, remove an increasing fraction of the corresponding highest scoring nodes.
The sequential targeted attack routine was also calculated with the main difference that the input was no longer the whole graph but that of the sub-graph resulting from the previous step. Then, centrality measures were computed at each time step, thus providing the highest scoring node to remove.
We also implemented error simulations, i.e., non-targeted attacks, whereby, in any step, an increasing fraction of nodes was removed at random, according to the following two schemes: a random fraction of nodes of the original network for the simultaneous scheme, a random node of the current network at each step in the sequential scheme.
During each simulation step, the network diameter was computed as the performance indicator of the network's resilience once the fraction of the removed nodes increased.
Results of the benchmark instances
The simulations were run on scale-free instances generated using the appropriate igraph function that builds networks with Barabási-Albert model. We created nine different classes of networks having three diverse numbers of nodes (n = 100, 250, 500) and three different values of the average cluster coefficient (C = 0.25, 0.50, 0.70). For each class, we generated 10 instances and the results of this Section are presented as averages for every class.
Each instance was tested in order to verify if the connectivity distribution followed the power law function, i.e., P (k) ∼ k −γ with slope γ as the scaling exponent (Clauset et al., 2009) . To evaluate the value of γ we used the goodness-of-fit approach for fitting the power law distribution to the data using a maximum likelihood estimator.
As a final test, we compared the slope of the power law degree distribution of each generated instance to the correspondent classic random graph having the same number of nodes and links, created using the Erdős P and Rényi model (Erdős P and Rényi, 1959) . This analysis was performed in order to exclude the randomness of the instances.
The instances were generated by setting the function parameters as a way to obtain disassortative networks since many real systems have this characteristic, typically observed in technological networks (D'Agostino et al., 2012) .
The basic properties of all the generated classes of instances are reported in Table 1 where columns 2 and 3 report the number of nodes n and arcs m respectively, column 4 shows the average degree k, column 5 the number of clusters K composing the network, column 6 the diameter D, column 7 the average shortest path L, column 8 reports the average clustering coefficient C and column 9 the assortative coefficient r.
In column 1 we report the instances' classes, the prefix g is for graph, the first number refers to the nodes, the second number represents the value of the average cluster coefficient.
Note that the values of the diameter and the average shortest path are consistent with the growing values of the average clustering coefficient. Resilience results are reported for 100 nodes in Figure 1 As expected, error simulations are considerable less effective with respect to attack simulations and robustness increases as the clustering coefficient rises. Note that for the simultaneous attack, the diameter fluctuates since at each time step, the fraction of the removed nodes is different due to the random selection.
It is evident that under simultaneous targeted attack, the degree centrality measure is the most effective in degrading the structure of the networks. Indeed, the degree is a local measure as it is restricted to the neighbours of nodes while the others are considered as global quantities since they capture the redundancy of the patterns of paths (betweenness and closeness centrality), the transitivity structure of relationships (clustering coefficient) and the relative quality of connections (eigenvector centrality) in the network. Under simultaneous attack, the targeted nodes with the highest degree dismantle the paths along which the diameter is supposed to be computed, though the structure of all paths responds a little slower before its deterioration. However, the differences tend to become smaller as the value of n increases.
If we consider the closeness and eigenvector centrality measures, the attacks are slightly more effective than those addressed to nodes with high betweenness. Indeed, the removal of nodes according to the first two quantities decreases the quality of connections in the network earlier than the number of paths crossing a single node. This is due to the presence of nodes having low degree but acting as a bridge.
Referring to the clustering coefficient measure, it is the less effective in degrading the diameter value since the nodes' removal reduces the number of triangles but preserve the pattern of paths. When the last triangle disappears (or few remain), the diameter falls down because the giant component becomes a tree (or a sub-network with a very low density). We note that the network resilience increases when the average clustering coefficient grows but less so with respect to the value of n. When triangles increase in a network with fixed n, density tends to rise, allowing a greatest number of admissible paths. This result is in contrast with the outcome presented in Iyer et al. (2013) where vulnerability increases (i.e., resilience decreases) as the average clustering coefficient increases. This is due to the definition of vulnerability, which is focused on the size of the residual network under attack rather than on the structure of paths, such as the diameter. Such a difference highlights the inherent difficulty in finding the most appropriate methodology to be used for studying the resilience in complex networks. If we consider the simulations under the sequential schemes, we note some differences with respect to the simultaneous strategies.
In cases of error, we observe that this strategy is still less effective regarding the targeted attack. However, we note that the diameter does not fluctuate as in the sequential case, since the node removal is performed at each time step on the residual network resulting from the previous step.
The sequential targeted attack performed taking into consideration betweenness, closeness and eigenvector centrality is more effective in dismantling the structure of the network rather than the degree as depicted in Figures 1((a)-( 
This is due to the fact that for a given removed node the neighbourhoods' degree decreases of one unit, while at each single step, the sequential attack exploits the knowledge of the best pattern of paths caused by the recalculation of the centrality measures. In other words, this can be seen as a decrease of the redundancy of the paths in the system. When clustering coefficient increases the resilience tends to grow very similarly as in the case of a simultaneous attack. Again, this result is opposite to the one presented in Iyer et al. (2013) .
As expected, from Figures 1-3 it is clear that a sequential attack is considerably more effective than a simultaneous attack. Indeed, at each time step the recalculation of the centrality measure allows for the identification of the candidate nodes for which the removal intercepts the pattern of paths with the effect of reducing their redundancy.
However, for both simulation schemes there are small differences in the effectiveness of the attack based on different centrality measures and this is in accordance to the open literature regarding the resilience. Nevertheless, in order to give more insights into the degrading of the network, we decided to use a threshold of crash as introduced in Section 3. Figure 4 shows the giant component as a function of the fraction of nodes removed for instances g250_50 for the two simulation attack schemes. It reports the network robustness according to the degree, betweenness, closeness and eigenvector centrality, averaged on 10 instances. The horizontal lines are the thresholds set at 5% with respect to the size of the original network.
In case of a simultaneous targeted attack, the degree centrality has the sharpest slope while the eigenvector centrality seems to be less effective. When 50% of nodes are removed, the giant component has an average size of 20% and the threshold of 5% is reached when 75% of nodes are detached.
For the sequential targeted attack, the giant component has an average size of 20% of the original network when 40% of nodes are removed and the threshold drops down to 50% of nodes removed. Betweenness centrality has the sharpest slope while the attack addressed to nodes with high degree becomes less effective. Under this scheme, we note two different curves slopes; the first slope is comparable to those of simultaneous targeted attacks (until 25% of fraction of removed nodes), while the second is steepest. The reason for this behaviour is that due to the crucial importance of the hubs, their removal strongly damages the network irrespective of the scheme of attack used. Afterwards, the network is more exposed, especially to sequential targeted attacks that are based on the ability to select the most critical nodes inside an already damaged network.
The previous figures and all discussions provide insights into when the network crashes as a result of the removal of nodes. Thus, Table 2 reports the max value of the diameter as information about the magnitude of degradation in communication patterns. In the table, column 1 reports the network class name, column 2 the initial value of the diameter, column 3 the max value of the diameter under error simulation, columns 4 to 8 the max values for degree, betweenness, closeness, clustering coefficient and eigenvector centrality for simultaneous and sequential simulations.
Simulations confirm that the degree is the most effective in degrading the magnitude of the original diameter. Note that diameter degrades more if the number of nodes increases while it is less sensitive to clustering coefficient because the max values are similar for fixed n. Finally, under sequential targeted attack, differences between the considered measure are less evident and in many graph classes the eigenvector centrality measure results more effective than the degree.
Data analysis of the empirical networks
The analysis was performed on a set of empirical complex networks freely available and widely used in literature. The criteria used to select the presented complex networks among the available sets are mainly related to the consideration of a wide range of basic properties in term of number of nodes, number of clusters, diameter, average cluster coefficient and assortative coefficient.
The four empirical networks are: the nervous system of the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans (Watts and Strogatz, 1998; White et al., 1996) , the Enterprise Europe Network (EEN) in 2011 , the network representing the topology of the Western States Power Grid of the United States (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) and the network of coauthorships between scientists posting preprints on the High-Energy Theory E-Print Archive between 1 January, 1995 and 31 December, 1999 (Newman, 2001) . Note that the Caenorhabditis elegans (C. elegans) network is originally a directed graph but we ignored the arcs' directions since they are not meaningful in our analysis. With the same setting of Table 1 , we resume, in Table 3 , the basic properties of all the benchmark networks. Figure 5 depicts the resilience for the empirical networks. We note that the rate of damage is slower in case of error simulation with respect to the attack schemes, with the exception of the power grid network that degrades much faster than the other three observed systems. In particular, such a network has a small-world organisation (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) but the nodes' degree distribution does not fit within the scale-free definition, so the results for the error simulation are consistent with Albert et al. (2000) , where error tolerance shows to be high only for scale-free networks.
Simulations on empirical networks confirm the results of the benchmark instances since it appears clear that the sequential targeted attack is the most effective in degrading the systems, mainly for the power grid and for the high-energy collaboration networks. Furthermore, the behaviour under different centrality measures is confirmed in the two different simulation schemes.
The C. elegans network has a small-world organisation (Watts and Strogatz, 1998 ) with many nodes with comparable degree. Thus, the simulations show a relatively small level of degrading since there are very few representative neurons in the network. The EEN is a scale-free network with γ = 2.82 and the simulations show behaviour comparable to the benchmark instances.
For the power grid network it is particularly interesting to note the effectiveness of the sequential attack considering other centrality measures instead of the degree. These aspects are particularly crucial when a real system is considered. In other terms, if we refer to a clairvoyant attack to a critical infrastructure such as a power grid, it could generate extremely dangerous effects on the national security of the involved country.
The high-energy collaboration network has a scaling exponent γ close to 1 and it shows that the few individuals having the large degree dominate the average properties of the whole system (Newman, 2001 ). This explains the same behaviour of the two attack schemes when the selected measure is the degree. Furthermore, the network degrades quickly when betweenness and closeness quantities are considered. Indeed, the removal of the few central nodes causes, at early stage of simulation, a quick increase of the path length patterns hence, the network breaks in many disconnected components.
Non-clairvoyant analysis and discussion
We present some preliminary results considering both simulation schemes when the attacker is non-clairvoyant and thus ignores some parts of the network structure. In particular, we set the simulations as the attacker ignores the nodes with the higher centrality values. When the simultaneous scheme is considered, the ignored node is always the same since the centrality values are computed at the beginning of the simulation. On the other hand, for the sequential scheme the node could actually change since centrality measures are computed in each step. Besides the standard degree centrality (Chen and Cheng, 2015; Xiao et al., 2008) , herein we also extend the analysis to the betweenness centrality measures referring only to benchmark instance classes with C = 0.50. We observe that when the attacker is non-clairvoyant, the magnitude of the diameter maintains similar values with respect to the initial one. Thus, the remaining patterns of communication in the giant component are still effective and the functionality of the residual network is preserved.
In Figures 1(d) , 2(d) and 3(d) the diameter evolution for the clairvoyant schemes (Attack for degree and Att_B for betweenness centrality) is compared with those of non-clairvoyant (Attack_W for degree and Att_BW for betweenness centrality).
Simulation results confirm that the sequential targeted attack is the most effective strategy for crashing the network. We notice that if the attack is addressed to the nodes with high betweenness centrality, the network structure will be rapidly affected.
The main difference is in the decaying of the diameter that is consistently smoother with respect to the non-clairvoyant attack. Indeed, the diameter remains almost unchanged even in cases when a great portion of nodes is removed. The reason for this behaviour is, when the attacker ignores the nodes with the highest centrality, a star sub-graph remains as giant component maintaining the average diameter around 2. Figure 6 confirms this behaviour, showing that the graph constantly decays until the complete removal of all nodes. However, we observe a slight difference referring to the degree centrality: the threshold of 5% is reached earlier when 80% of nodes are removed. Although the results presented in this section are not very surprising, we perceive that the study of attacks performed by the non-clairvoyant affects the strategy of network defence significantly. This is relevant when we observe the crashing of real systems, such as telecommunication or computer networks, or systems related to homeland security, taking into account the different centrality measures. These issues suggest that further research should be devoted in the future, considering a wide number of different scenarios. Table 4 reports the maximum value of the diameter for the different simulations. Column 1 reports the network class name, column 2 the initial value of the diameter, column 3 and 4 the values of the diameter for clairvoyant and non-clairvoyant attacks respectively when the centrality measure is the degree, columns 5 and 6 the values of the diameter for clairvoyant and non-clairvoyant attack respectively when the centrality measure is the betweenness. We notice that under the non-clairvoyant attack, the diameter is almost preserved by means of the survived hub, which acts as a bridge and still ensures the communication between nodes. Finally, as n grows, its effect on the diameter is more evident.
Conclusion
This paper analyses the network resilience from the complex networks' perspective. We survey the effects on the diameter when a network is exposed to random and intentional attacks. Such effects have been studied by means of a wide range of simulations considering ad hoc benchmark instances and empirical networks. Simulations have been conducted under two different schemes of node removal: the simultaneous targeted and sequential targeted attacks. Moreover, we considered different centrality measures and clustering coefficients as selection criteria in order to choose the most relevant nodes in the system. We bring into focus the existence of two different attacks' situations, introducing a new taxonomy: the clairvoyant and non-clairvoyant attacks. The first occurs when the attacker acts under full knowledge of the network structure and the second arises in the more realistic case when the attacker acts whilst ignoring a portion of the network.
Simulations show that the sequential targeted attack is the most effective attack strategy to disrupt a network. In this case, it assumes a detailed knowledge of the network architecture, an ability to target the crucial nodes at each step and a desire to deliberately destroy the system. It is not predictable, a priori, which one of the analysed attacks is more dangerous than the others, although we can expect that the strategies based on the recalculated centrality measures at every step are more harmful. Indeed, the most damaging sequences for removals of nodes might differ significantly even in the early stage of attacks.
The analysis of resilience is of particular interest in many different scenarios, such as technological networks, counterterrorism analysis, transportation networks and risk analysis on supply chain management. The inherent ambiguity of the study of resilience is worth the efforts in further research devoted to the identification of some cornerstones in this field. However, this is a significant task since the open literature still offers several different approaches.
Due to the importance of the applications, particular attention should be addressed to the non-clairvoyant attacks although this aspect introduces an additional level of complexity.
